{"id":4,"date":"2012-06-15T06:09:32","date_gmt":"2012-06-15T06:09:32","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/philosophy.utoronto.ca\/faculty\/huber\/?page_id=4"},"modified":"2026-04-01T01:46:45","modified_gmt":"2026-04-01T01:46:45","slug":"research","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/huber.artsci.utoronto.ca\/?page_id=4","title":{"rendered":"Research"},"content":{"rendered":"

My AOS are Formal Epistemology, General Philosophy of Science, and Philosophical Logic. My AOC is Metaphysics.<\/p>\n

Books<\/h2>\n

(2026) Causality, Counterfactuals, and Belief. More Means-End Philosophy<\/em>.<\/a>\u00a0New York: Oxford University Press. (hardcover<\/a> 216 pages \/ ebook<\/a> 216 pages)<\/p>\n

(2021)\u00a0Belief and Counterfactuals<\/em>.\u00a0A Study in Means-End Philosophy<\/em>.<\/a>\u00a0New York: Oxford University Press. (hardcover<\/a> 208 pages \/ ebook<\/a> 208 pages)<\/p>\n

(2018)\u00a0A Logical Introduction to Probability and Induction<\/em>.<\/a>\u00a0New York: Oxford University Press. (hardcover<\/a>\u00a0306 pages \/\u00a0ebook<\/a>\u00a0305 pages \/\u00a0paperback<\/a>\u00a0304 pages, excluding a 43 pages\u00a0instructor’s manual<\/a>)<\/p>\n

(2004)\u00a0Assessing Theories. The Problem of a Quantitative Theory of Confirmation<\/em>. PhD Dissertation. Erfurt: University of Erfurt. (urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-200400640<\/a>)<\/p>\n

Papers in Refereed Journals<\/h2>\n

(2017a) On the Justification of Deduction and Induction<\/a>. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science<\/a><\/em> 7<\/strong> (3), 507-534. local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2017b) Why Follow the Royal Rule?<\/a> Synthes<\/span>e<\/span><\/em><\/a> 194<\/strong> (5), 1565-1590. local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2015a) How to Learn Concepts, Consequences, and Conditionals<\/a>. \u03b1nalytica<\/em><\/a> 1<\/strong> (1), 20-36. open access!<\/span><\/p>\n

(2015b) What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?<\/a> Journal of Philosophical Logic<\/em><\/a> 44<\/strong> (1), 81-110.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2015c) with P. Br\u00f6ssel, Bayesian Confirmation: A Means With no End<\/a><\/span>. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science<\/span><\/em><\/a> 66<\/strong> (4), 737-749.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

(2014a) New Foundations for Counterfactuals<\/a>. Synthese<\/em><\/a>\u00a0191<\/strong> (10), 2167-2193. local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2014b) For True Conditionalizers Weisberg’s Paradox is a False Alarm<\/span><\/a>. Symposion<\/span><\/em><\/a> 1<\/strong> (1), 111-119. open access!<\/span><\/p>\n

(2014c) What is the Permissibility Solution a Solution of? – A Question for Kroedel<\/span><\/a>. Logos and Episteme<\/span><\/em><\/a> 5<\/strong> (3), 333-342. open access!<\/span><\/p>\n

(2013a) Structural Equations and Beyond<\/a>. The Review of Symbolic Logic<\/em><\/a>\u00a06<\/strong> (4), 709-732.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2013b) Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory<\/a>. Philosophy Compass<\/em><\/a> 8<\/strong> (7),\u00a0604-612.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2013c) Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory<\/a>. Philosophy Compass<\/em><\/a> 8<\/strong> (7), 613-621.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2013d) Belief First<\/a>. The Reasoner<\/em><\/a> 7<\/strong> (7), 82. open access!<\/span><\/p>\n

(2013e) with T. Kroedel, Counterfactual Dependence and Arrow<\/a>.\u00a0No\u00fbs<\/em><\/a> 47<\/strong> (3),\u00a0453-466. local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2013f)\u00a0with P. Br\u00f6ssel, A. Eder, Evidential Support and Instrumental<\/a>\u00a0Rationality<\/a>.\u00a0Philosophy and Phenomenological Research<\/em><\/a> 87 (2), 279-300. local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2011a)\u00a0Lewis Causation is a Special Case of Spohn Causation<\/a>.\u00a0British Journal for the Philosophy of Science<\/em><\/a>\u00a062<\/strong>\u00a0(1), 207-210.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2008a)\u00a0Milne’s Argument for the Log-Ratio Measure<\/a>.\u00a0Philosophy of Science<\/em><\/a>\u00a075<\/strong>\u00a0(4), 413-420.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2008b)\u00a0Reply to Crupi et al.’s ‘Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence’ ([2008])<\/a>.\u00a0British Journal for the Philosophy of Science<\/em><\/a>\u00a059<\/strong>\u00a0(2), 213-215.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2008c)\u00a0Hempel’s Logic of Confirmation<\/a>.\u00a0Philosophical Studies<\/em><\/a>\u00a0139<\/strong>\u00a0(2), 181-189.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2008d)\u00a0Assessing Theories, Bayes Style<\/a>.\u00a0Synthese<\/em><\/a>\u00a0161<\/strong>\u00a0(1), 89-118.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2007a)\u00a0The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions<\/a>.\u00a0Studia Logica<\/em><\/a>\u00a086<\/strong>\u00a0(2), 299-329.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2007b)\u00a0The Logic of Theory Assessment<\/a>.\u00a0Journal of Philosophical Logic<\/em><\/a>\u00a036<\/strong>\u00a0(5), 511-538.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2006a)\u00a0Ranking Functions and Rankings on Languages<\/a>.\u00a0Artificial Intelligence<\/em><\/a>\u00a0170<\/strong>\u00a0(4-5), 462-471.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2005a)\u00a0What Is the Point of Confirmation?<\/a>\u00a0Philosophy of Science<\/em><\/a>\u00a072<\/strong>\u00a0(5), 1146-1159.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2005b)\u00a0Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?<\/a>\u00a0British Journal for the Philosophy of Science<\/em><\/a>\u00a056<\/strong>\u00a0(1), 101-116.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

Encyclopedia Entries<\/h2>\n

(2019) Ranking Theory<\/a>. In R. Pettigrew & J. Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology<\/em><\/a>. Philpapers Foundation, 397-436. open access!<\/span><\/p>\n

(2011b)\u00a0Confirmation<\/a>.\u00a0Oxford Bibliographies Online<\/em><\/a>.\u00a0Revised with J. Dallmann in 2017. local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2009a) Ranking Functions. In J.R. Rabunal Dopico & J. Dorado de la Calle & A. Pazos Sierra (eds.),\u00a0Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence<\/em>. Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 1351-1355.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2008e)\u00a0Formal Representations of Belief<\/a>. In E.N. Zalta (ed.),\u00a0Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/em><\/a>. Revised in 2012 and 2016. Revised with K. Genin in 2020. (25,000+ words) open access!<\/span><\/p>\n

(2008f) Inductive Logic. In J. Lachs & R. Talisse (eds.),\u00a0Encyclopedia of American Philosophy<\/em>. New York: Routledge, 475-478.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2007c)\u00a0Confirmation and Induction<\/a>. In J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.),\u00a0Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/em><\/a>. (15.000+ words) open access!<\/span><\/p>\n

Other Papers<\/h2>\n

(2016) Means-End Philosophy<\/a>. In W. Freitag & H. Rott & H. Sturm & A. Zinke (eds.), Von Rang und Namen. Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn<\/em>. M\u00fcnster: Mentis, 173-198.<\/p>\n

(2009b)\u00a0Belief and Degrees of Belief<\/a>. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.),\u00a0Degrees of Belief<\/em><\/a>.\u00a0Synthese Library<\/em>\u00a0342<\/strong>. Dordrecht: Springer, 1-33.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2007d)\u00a0The Plausibility-Informativeness Theory<\/a>. In V.F. Hendricks & D.H. Pritchard (eds.),\u00a0New Waves in Epistemology<\/em><\/a>. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 164-191.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2005c) The Logic of Confirmation and Theory Assessment. In L. Behounek & M. Bilkova (eds.),\u00a0The Logica Yearbook 2004<\/em>. Prague: Filosofia, 161-176.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2005d) The Logic of Confirmation. In O. Neumaier & C. Sedmak & M. Zichy (eds.),\u00a0Philosophische Perspektiven. Beitr\u00e4ge zum VII. Internationalen Kongress der \u00d6GP<\/em>. Frankfurt\/Main – Lancaster: Ontos, 309-315.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2003) Degrees of Belief as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? In W. Loeffler & P. Weingartner (eds.),\u00a0Knowledge and Belief. Papers of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg\/Wechsel (Austria) 2003<\/em>. Kirchberg: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 143-146.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

Reviews<\/h2>\n

(2012) Review<\/a> of Wolfgang Spohn, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications<\/a> (Oxford University Press 2012). Philosophy of Science<\/em><\/a> 79<\/strong> (4), 584-588. local file<\/a><\/p>\n

(2006b) Review<\/a> of Vincent F. Hendricks,\u00a0Mainstream and Formal Epistemology<\/a>\u00a0(Cambridge University Press 2006).\u00a0Philosophy in Review<\/em><\/a>\u00a026<\/strong>\u00a0(4), 257-259.\u00a0local file<\/a><\/p>\n

Editions<\/h2>\n

(2009c) ed. with E. Swanson & J. Weisberg, Conditionals and Ranking Functions. Special Issue of\u00a0Erkenntnis<\/em><\/a>. With contributions by C. Cross, R. Stalnaker, R. Williams, T. Williamson and an Editorial (133-134).<\/p>\n

(2009d) ed. with C. Schmidt-Petri,\u00a0Degrees of Belief<\/a>. Synthese Library<\/em>\u00a0342<\/strong>. Dordrecht: Springer. With contributions by R. Foley, K. Frankish, R. Haenni, A. H\u00e1jek, J. Hawthorne, C. Howson, F. Huber, J. Joyce, D. Makinson, H. Prade & D. Dubois, H. Rott, B. Skyrms, W. Spohn. Paperback edition October 2009.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

My AOS are Formal Epistemology, General Philosophy of Science, and Philosophical Logic. My AOC is Metaphysics. Books (2026) Causality, Counterfactuals, and Belief. More Means-End Philosophy.\u00a0New York: Oxford University Press. (hardcover 216 pages \/ ebook 216 pages) (2021)\u00a0Belief and Counterfactuals.\u00a0A Study … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":2,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-4","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/huber.artsci.utoronto.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/huber.artsci.utoronto.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/huber.artsci.utoronto.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/huber.artsci.utoronto.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/huber.artsci.utoronto.ca\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=4"}],"version-history":[{"count":262,"href":"https:\/\/huber.artsci.utoronto.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1132,"href":"https:\/\/huber.artsci.utoronto.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4\/revisions\/1132"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/huber.artsci.utoronto.ca\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=4"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}